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1	 From	1918-1929	the	official	name	of	the	state	was	the	Kingdom	of	Serbs,	
Croats,	and	Slovenes,	thereafter	it	became	the	Kingdom	of	Yugoslavia.	
For	the	sake	of	brevity	it	will	be	referred	to	throughout	this	article	as	
Yugoslavia.	
2	 Alan	Kramer,	Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First 
World War (Oxford	2007)	1.	
Introduction
The lives of both interwar Yugoslavia (1918-
1941) and its socialist successor (1945-1991) 
began and ended in periods of mass, intereth-
nic violence. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) 1 was formed in 
1918 after a long period of total war, starting 
with the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 and then 
intensifying during 1914-1918. The state’s 
occupation and dismemberment by the Axis 
in 1941 was followed by a Yugoslav civil war 
from 1941-1945. And the break-up of the so-
cialist state during 1991-1995 was attended 
by inter-ethnic violence and wars in Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia). 
Why this propensity? Why should 
Yugoslavia have been, in both its royalist 
and socialist iterations, framed by periods 
of mass violence? This article will focus on 
the first half of the twentieth century, from 
1903 to 1945. It will highlight the important 
links between the mass violence of 1912-
1918 and 1941-1945 through an examina-
tion of Serbian integral nationalism and its 
opponents. In this article the term Serbian 
integral nationalism refers to the strain of 
Serbian nationalism that called for the inte-
gration of all Serb-populated lands into one 
national whole, generally without regard of 
existing political circumstances or the ethnic 
composition of the lands in question. This 
impulse was present throughout our period, 
it clashed with rival nationalisms and created 
what Alan Kramer was termed a ‘dynamic 
of destruction’, wherein violence and the de-
struction of non-national culture was ‘both a 
by-product of combat and the consequence 
of a deliberate policy’.2 Integral nationalists 
in Serbia frequently directed their efforts 
towards Kosovo and Macedonia, which were 
divided between vilayets (provinces) of the 
Ottoman Empire until 1912 and whose eth-
nic composition was mixed.
This article will argue that the support-
ers of this kind of nationalism strongly influ-
enced the programme of the Yugoslav Army 
in the Fatherland (the Chetniks), pushing its 
leaders towards a policy of ethnic cleansing of 
non-Serbs as a means of creating an integral 
Serbian state on the territory they held. It 
will be shown that the Chetniks’ ideology and 
their role in mass violence was determined in 
large part by supporters of the Serbian na-
tional project dating back to 1903. Links will 
also be drawn between the opponents of this 
project: most notably Austria-Hungary, its 
supporters in the Croat lands during the First 
World War, and the Croatian fascist move-
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ment, the Ustashe, during the Second World 
War. Like the Chetniks, the Ustashe were 
perpetrators of mass violence during the civil 
war in Yugoslavia during 1941-1945. Anti-
Yugoslav Croats in exile formed the Ustasha 
Croatian Revolutionary Organization move-
ment at the beginning of the 1930s, osten-
sibly as a response to the promulgation of 
the royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia the year 
before. The Ustashe partly was comprised 
ex-Habsburg officers of Croat descent and 
former Frankists, the latter a pro-Habsburg 
political faction strongly opposed to Serbian 
nationalism. This article will show that many 
of the founders of the Ustashe had also been 
associated with Austria-Hungary’s violent 
attempts to ‘denationalize’ Serbia during the 
First World War.
1903: The ‘Golden Age’ Begins
In 1903 a group of army officers deposed 
the Serbian King Aleksandar Obrenović, an 
event that significantly altered Serbia’s tra-
jectory in the twentieth century. Aleksandar 
had been on the throne in Serbia since 1889; 
during his reign many had become hostile 
to his autocratic style and many more were 
scandalized by his marriage to Draga Mašin, 
a widow and a woman ‘with a past’. Officers 
in the Serbian Army felt that Aleksandar, 
as Supreme Commander of the Army, had 
brought their institution into disrepute. From 
1902 onwards they conspired against him, 
and in May (O.S.) the following year they car-
ried out a coup, breaking into the royal palace 
and murdering both Aleksandar and Queen 
Draga.3 The coup was a bloody affair, both 
Aleksandar and Draga were thrown out of a 
palace window, after which conspirators on 
the ground below maimed their corpses with 
sabres. It caused outrage in diplomatic circles 
across Europe and had a number of impor-
tant consequences in Serbia. Aleksandar was 
replaced by Petar Karađorđević, heir of the ri-
val Serbian dynasty, who returned from exile 
in Geneva to take the throne. Serbia became 
a constitutional monarchy, and the Serbian 
People’s Radical Party formed the first post-
coup government. The party would come to 
dominate the country’s political scene until 
the outbreak of the First World War.4 
A popular perception of Serbia from 
1903 until 1914 is of a ‘golden age’ of func-
tioning parliamentary democracy and con-
stitutional rule. King Petar is often seen as 
an instinctively liberal king whose authority 
was curtailed by the constitution of 1903, the 
People’s Radical Party is cast as the midwife 
of a modern and democratic political system. 
Contrary to this perception, recent research 
has shown that the period from the coup un-
til the outbreak of the First World War was 
characterized not only by democratic consol-
idation and institution-building but also by 
aggressive expansionism and hawkish foreign 
policy.5 For many in Serbia their kingdom 
in 1903 was surrounded by ‘unredeemed’ 
lands: to the south, the medieval Serbian 
lands of Kosovo and Macedonia, still part 
of the Ottoman Empire; to the west, Bosnia, 
with its large Serb population. The national-
ists’ dream was to integrate these lands into 
Serbia proper, so that the Serbs there could 
share in the golden age of political freedom 
and modernization. Nationalists particularly 
cherished the ‘southern regions’ of Kosovo 
and Macedonia, the sites of great importance 
to Serbia’s historical and religious heritage. 
National awakeners of the nineteenth cen-
tury had repeatedly emphasized the impor-
tance of these lands, the so-called ‘classical 
south’ of Serbia.
War in the ‘Classical South’
There was, then, a will to redeem ‘Serbian’ 
lands; there was also a way. For years groups 
of Christian bandits had operated in the 
Ottoman Balkans. Known to the Ottomans 
as komitadji, they referred to themselves as 
četnici, a name derived from the Balkan word 
četa, meaning troop or (military) unit. In 
1902 Serbian nationalists had organized a 
četnik ‘executive committee’ with branches in 
various towns across Serbia whose aim was to 
co-ordinate and strengthen the national cha-
racter of banditry in the Ottoman Balkans.6 
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The private initiative was appealing to some 
young Serbs – both from within Serbia and 
from Habsburg and Ottoman territories – 
who were eager to assist in the important ‘na-
tional work’ of the četnik committee.7 Initially 
unsupportive of the ‘hot heads’ in the south, 
by 1905 the Serbian government was lending 
official support – both moral and material 
– to the četnici.8 Expediency sometimes dic-
tated that official Serbia distance itself from 
the četnici, nevertheless they shared the com-
mittee’s interest in turning desultory acts of 
banditry into more concerted anti-imperial 
guerrilla action. This was the significance 
of the 1903 coup: it brought the četnici into 
closer alignment with official Serbian policy; 
irredentism in the south had the support of 
the government. 
The aim of Serbian policy in the Ottoman 
Balkans was both to weaken the empire’s 
grip there and to ‘Serbianize’ or ‘national-
ize’ the regions as part of their eventual in-
corporation into the Serbian state. This 
meant supporting and promoting the work 
of četnici who fought against the Ottomans 
(and against rival Balkan guerrilla groups: 
especially those from Bulgaria) and dissemi-
nating Serbian nationalist propaganda (in 
churches and schools, for example) so as to 
strengthen the basis of Serbian national life 
in Kosovo and Macedonia. It is here that we 
see the peculiar Janus-face of the Kingdom 
of Serbia from 1903-1914: both progressive 
and modernizing and aggressively expansion-
ist and willing to wield violence. On the one 
hand, the Belgrade government and its sup-
porters were building schools and churches, 
even theatres – to promote Serbian claims in 
Democracy Rides in to Serbia on a White Horse: King Petar Karađorđević at his coronation in 1904.
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Kosovo and Macedonia, on the other hand 
they were funding and training paramilitary 
četnici to terrorize non-Serbs and destroy 
non-Serb culture and heritage. It is no co-
incidence that this period marked the be-
ginning of the work of the Circle of Serbian 
Sisters, founded in Belgrade in 1903. The 
Circle of Serbian Sisters was a nationalist 
humanitarian society whose activities were 
focussed primarily on the unredeemed lands 
of Kosovo and Macedonia. Their humanitar-
ian work appears to be at odds with the vio-
lence of the četnici; in fact it was the merely 
the other side of the Serbian nationalizing 
mission in the south. Nor is it a co-incidence 
that a number of četnici were or became 
schoolteachers, journalists, and parliamen-
tary deputies. They were ‘national workers’: 
their portfolios were large and multifaceted.
These nationalizing policies were hardly 
a Serbian speciality: as Mark Biondich has 
shown, all Balkan states had in common ‘a 
commitment to the nationalist project, the 
homogenization of their societies, and the 
ideology of irredenta’.9 The ‘dynamic of de-
struction’ in the Ottoman Balkans was con-
tested as much between Serbia, Greece, and 
Bulgaria as it was between those states and 
the Ottoman Empire. There was certainly 
much violence against the Muslim popula-
tion, but there was also much intercommunal 
violence between the Orthodox Christian 
populations of the Balkans. In the period 
1903-1914 the dynamic reached a peak dur-
ing the two Balkan wars 1912-1913, whose 
origins lie in both the relative weakness of the 
Ottoman Empire in relation to the combined 
strength of the states of the Balkan Alliance 
(Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece) 
and nationalist rivalries between those 
Balkan states.
The ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the 
Balkans in the wake of the Ottoman defeat 
in 1912 was a result of this dynamic; it was 
partially a spontaneous by-product of war, 
but it was primarily a consequence of a de-
liberate policy. The Carnegie Endowment 
Report on the Balkan wars notes tellingly 
that Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek authori-
ties did little to prevent atrocities against 
the Muslim population during and after 
the First Balkan War.10 The victory of the 
Balkan Alliance meant the destruction and 
theft of property and systematic mass killing 
of the Muslim population.11The scale of the 
violence and the fact that Balkan authorities 
did little or nothing towards its prevention 
strongly suggests complicity. On the role of 
the četnici, one Serbian soldier, interviewed 
by Leon Trotsky, claimed these irregulars 
had committed most of the war’s atrocities. 
The četnici were ‘worse than you could pos-
sibly imagine. Among them there were intel-
lectuals, men of ideas, nationalist zealots, but 
these were isolated individuals. The rest were 
just thugs, robbers, who had joined the army 
for the sake of loot.’12 
Soon after the First Balkan War, in 
December 1913, a national theatre opened 
in Skopje; a seemingly incongruous event in a 
region recovering from war; it was in fact en-
tirely in line with Serbia’s nationalizing pro-
gramme in the south. The first performance 
at the new theatre was a re-enactment of the 
crowning of medieval Serbian king Dušan 
the Mighty, whose fourteenth century king-
dom had been based in Skopje.13 Serbian 
integral nationalists wanted to show that 
the medieval history of these regions corre-
sponded to the present reality.
The dynamic of destruction is evident 
once again during the Second Balkan War, 
which began when Bulgaria attacked its for-
mer Balkan allies over competing claims to 
territories won from the Ottomans in 1912. 
Serbia’s role in the victory over Bulgaria 
meant yet more territorial aggrandizement. 
Essentially, the victory meant the realisa-
tion of Serbia’s maximalist programme in 
the south. Since the beginning of the First 
Balkan War Serbia’s territory had almost 
doubled in size and now included most of 
Kosovo and Macedonia. In the short interbel-
lum between the end of the Second Balkan 
War and the beginning of the First World 
War nationalization/Serbianization ac-
celerated. Non-Serbian schools, churches, 
and cultural institutions were destroyed or 
closed, non-Serbian language newspapers 
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were suppressed, and the Slavic Christian 
inhabitants - whichever nationality they 
professed - were declared ‘Serbian’. Official 
Serbia decreed that the regions and their 
population be assimilated into Serbia proper. 
And an officially supported settlement pro-
gramme began in the south, as colonists from 
Serbia and Montenegro moved into ‘newly-
liberated’ (and newly-vacated) territories.14  
Austria-Hungary and Serbia 1903-1914
This new direction in Serbia’s foreign policy, 
culminating in the Balkan wars, was a con-
cern for Austria-Hungary. The Monarchy’s 
Serb population had grown significantly 
following the occupation of Bosnia in 1878; 
modern, national, and democratic Serbia was 
an attractive alternative to imperial rule for 
some Serbs in Austria-Hungary. Moreover, 
whilst Aleksandar Obrenović had been ame-
nable to Austria-Hungary and its regional in-
terests, Petar Karađorđević and the Radicals 
were ‘Russophiles’ who soon drew the coun-
try closer to the Monarchy’s imperial rival. 
Antagonisms between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia flared up repeatedly: the two fought 
a tariff war between 1906-1911 (known as 
the ‘Pig War’); the annexation of Bosnia in 
1908 inflamed nationalist circles in Serbia 
and Bosnia (although it also prompted offi-
cial Serbia to focus its efforts on the more at-
tainable irredenta in the south); and in 1909 
members of the Croat-Serb Coalition in the 
Croatian Sabor (Assembly) were accused of 
spying for Serbia in two sensational trials 
(the ‘Zagreb High Treason Trial’ and the 
‘Friedjung Trial’).15 The Balkan Wars then 
raised the stakes significantly. Serbia’s spec-
tacular military successes and her territorial 
aggrandizement in the south persuaded yet 
more Habsburg South Slavs (not exclusively 
Serbs) that Serbia could liberate them from 
imperial rule. A number of them crossed 
the border in order to volunteer to fight for 
Serbia.16 
Serbia’s successes also inspired revolu-
tionary South Slav youth in the monarchy to 
seek ‘an unofficial reckoning’ with Austria-
Hungary.17 From the beginning of the First 
Balkan War onwards South Slav youth in 
the Monarchy attempted a series of attentats 
on Habsburg functionaries and officials. The 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo 
Princip and the ‘Young Bosnia’ movement 
was the most sensational (and successful) of 
these attempts.18     
For many years the question of official 
Serbian involvement in the Sarajevo assas-
sination preoccupied historians of the First 
World War and its origins. It now seems cer-
tain that no such involvement existed. Clearly 
integral nationalists in Serbia supported the 
putative incorporation of Serb-populated 
Habsburg South Slav lands into an enlarged 
Serbia; clearly this idea was supported in 
principle by the Serbian government. But the 
idea that the First World War started as the 
‘Third Balkan War’ of Serbian national liber-
ation is fanciful; it implies that Serbia could 
confront Austria-Hungary in Bosnia just as 
it had confronted the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans.19 On this matter there is a visible dif-
ference between Serbia’s various unredeemed 
lands during 1903-1914: the links between 
official Serbia and the četnici are far more pro-
nounced in the south than they are in Bosnia. 
Moreover, at the time of the Sarajevo attentat 
the Serbian army was exhausted from fight-
ing two wars, the energies of the Serbian state 
were absorbed in the ‘nationalization’ process 
in the south, and the Radical government 
was in the middle of a closely-fought elec-
tion campaign. In the context of the Austro-
Hungarian declaration of war these points 
hardly matter: the Monarchy had reason to 
want Serbia’s golden age to end. Serbia’s suc-
cesses in the Balkan Wars begged the ques-
tion of an eventual expansion into Bosnia. 
Even if such an expansion was not supported 
in practice by official Serbia in 1914, national-
ist groups in Serbia and revolutionary South 
Slav Youth in the Habsburg lands were ready 
and willing to force the issue. The assassina-
tion of Franz Ferdinand was the casus belli 
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of the Habsburg-Serbian war, but Austria-
Hungary’s underlying aim was to confront 
and defeat an ascendant enemy. 
War and Mass Violence 1914-1918
The outbreak of war between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia, then, was the result 
both of the Serb and South Slav questions 
within the borders of the Monarchy and the 
risk of the Kingdom of Serbia staking a claim 
on Habsburg territories such as Bosnia. 
Whatever the European or global impli-
cations of the First World War, Austria-
Hungary’s war aims in Serbia appear to have 
been relatively modest: to curtail the nationa-
list and expansionist currents in Serbia which 
had been dominant from 1903 onwards.20 
To a certain extent the Habsburg fear about 
Serbian expansion in the Monarchy’s South 
Slav lands became a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Once attacked, the Serbian government had 
little to lose by openly stating that they were 
at war for the ‘liberation and unification’ 
from Habsburg rule of all South Slavs.21 
Austria-Hungary’s South Slav problem 
was thus consolidated: the long-held desire 
to suppress pro-Serbian and pro-Yugoslav 
sentiment within its borders was now cou-
pled with the opportunity for a showdown 
with Serbia itself. Violence and oppression 
were a function of this consolidated goal. At 
the beginning of the war, Austria-Hungary 
suppressed those who were actually or po-
tentially sympathetic to the Serbian cause. 
Authorities arrested and interned pro-Yu-
goslav intellectuals such as Oskar Tartaglia, 
Ante Tresić-Pavičić, and the Bosnian author 
(and future Nobel-laureate) Ivo Andrić.22 
Niko Bartulović, a Croat from Dalmatia 
amongst those interned, claimed that on the 
first day of the war 200 people were arrested 
in the town of Split alone.23 These initial in-
ternments developed into a more sophisti-
cated system of camps as the war went on. 
Austria-Hungary pursued a programme of 
‘denationalization’ that concentrated on the 
Serbian population, but which also targeted 
pro-Yugoslav South Slavs. According to one 
estimate, 3323 people from Bosnia were in-
terned during the war at the Arad camp in 
Hungary, of whom 553 did not survive.24 
Municipal, military, and judiciary authori-
ties were purged of Serbian or pro-Yugoslav 
elements.25 The largest trial of Serbs took 
place in Banja Luka from N ovember 1915 
until April 1916, when 156 Serbian intellec-
tuals and political and ecclesiastical leaders 
were accused of spying for Serbia. Sixteen 
of the accused were sentenced to death and 
eight-six to hard labour.26 In occupied Serbia 
itself, violence committed by the Austro-
Hungarian army was related in part to fears 
that četnici had secreted themselves amongst 
the civilian population. Swiss criminologist 
Rudolph Archibald Reiss, who gathered in-
formation on Austro-Hungarian atrocities 
against Serbs during September, October, 
and November 1914, saw a design in this vio-
lence. According to Reiss, the extent of vio-
lence – which included hangings, burning of 
property, and pillage – meant that it was ‘im-
possible to look upon the atrocities that have 
been committed as the acts of a few apaches’; 
the violence was in fact ‘systematic’.27
We must reject the idea of a pathologi-
cal hatred of Serbia on the part of Austria-
Hungary as the root cause of violence during 
1914-1918, or the idea that violence was sim-
ply a form of collective punishment on Serbia 
for killing Franz Ferdinand. This element 
was certainly present: spontaneous anti-Serb 
demonstrations – even pogroms – took place 
in towns across Croatia and Bosnia in the 
days after the attentat.28 However, the dura-
tion and extent of the violence, its co-ordina-
tion, and its official sanction confirm its in-
tent: Austria-Hungary wanted to take Serbia 
back to its pre-1903, pre-coup self. The oc-
cupation authorities even raised a monument 
to Aleksandar Obrenović and Draga Mašin 
in Belgrade during the war, a reminder of a 
more acceptable period of Habsburg-Serb 
relations. 
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Croat Support for War against Serbia: The 
Frankists
There is another important dimension to the 
violence of 1914-1918: the Habsburg-Serb 
war was to an extent also an inter-ethnic 
conflict between Habsburg South Slavs and 
Serbia. This dimension was significant for 
the future South Slav state. We have seen 
that Austria-Hungary was greatly concerned, 
before and during the war, with South Slavs 
who supported Serbia against the Monarchy. 
In fact, there were also many South Slavs who 
were loyal to the Habsburgs. No group was 
louder in its support of Austria-Hungary’s 
war and in its attacks on Serbia and Serbs 
than the Croatian Pure Party of Right – 
known as the ‘Frankists – a Croatian natio-
nalist opposition faction in the Sabor whose 
anti-Serbianism sat well with Habsburg war 
aims in Serbia.29 It was the Frankists’ hope 
that their loyalty to the Habsburgs would be 
rewarded in the post-war period with a re-
organization of the Monarchy which raised 
South Slavs (that is to say, Croats) to the 
same level as Hungarians and Germans, thus 
replacing ‘dualism’ with ‘trialism’.30 To this 
end, they shared the Habsburgs’ desire to 
reverse nationalist trends amongst the Serbs.
The Frankists were in opposition in the 
Sabor during the war, divided internally and 
defeated in the 1913 elections by the Croat-
Serb Coalition. They were a minority voice, 
but their loyalty to the Habsburgs meant 
they were close to ruling circles. They were a 
Habsburg elite and their support of Austria-
Hungary’s war meant they were favoured by 
another of the Monarchy’s elites: Habsburg 
army officers of Croat descent. Like the 
Frankists, many such officers did not see a 
contradiction in fighting for both Habsburg 
and Croat interests during the war: the com-
mon enemy was Serbian nationalism and 
the reward was increased autonomy within 
the Monarchy (it must be remembered that 
until a very late stage in the war most people 
in and out of Austria-Hungary expected the 
Monarchy to survive in some form or other). 
Examples of higher-ranking soldiers who 
supported the Monarchy abound: perhaps 
most notable was Stjepan Sarkotić, military 
governor general of Bosnia and Dalmatia for 
most of the war. Sarkotić was a supporter of 
the ‘trialist’ solution, and it was he who ar-
ranged the ‘Banja Luka Trials ‘ of 1916-1917 
with the aim of decapitating the Serbian na-
tional elite in Bosnia. Johann Salis-Sewis, 
the Croat general and governor of occupied 
Serbia, shared his views. Salis-Sewis also had 
a radical solution to the Serbian problem: the 
incorporation of Serbia into the Monarchy 
and the continued suppression of Serbian 
national life. As he vividly put it, ‘it is better 
that an enemy is in my room where I hold a 
pistol than outside my door with a pistol in 
his hand.’31
For their part, it seems that the Frankists 
hoped that something definite would come 
from their links with ruling Habsburg cir-
cles and their proximity to the Habsburg 
military. Frankist leaders had previously 
raised the idea of a ‘Military Commissariat’ 
of Habsburg generals taking control in the 
Croat lands. In the middle of 1918, as the war 
reached a critical stage for Austria-Hungary, 
police in Zagreb found documents in which 
leading Frankists called for a suspension of 
the Sabor and the introduction of military 
rule in Croatia.32 The Frankists hoped that 
an Austro-Hungarian general would be able 
to prevent ‘Serbian sabotage’ in the region; 
they also preferred the idea of pro-Habsburg 
military rule to the Croat-Serb Coalition’s ci-
vilian assembly. The plan for a military com-
missariat was not realized – and was probably 
never likely to be realized – nevertheless, it 
demonstrates the close relationship between 
the Frankists and Habsburg military circles 
before and during the war. 
Austria-Hungary’s defeat in 1918 was 
also the defeat of the Frankists and their 
supporters in the Habsburg officer corps. 
For many Frankists, the Allied and Serbian 
victory confirmed their worst fears: a super-
charged Serbian nationalism had defeated 
Austria-Hungary and now dominated the 
other South Slav nationalities in Yugoslavia. 
In fact, their defeat was two-fold: not only 
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had the Franksts been intimately connected 
to the defunct empire – a fatal association in 
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia – they were also 
eclipsed in interwar Croatia’s politics by the 
mass popularity of Stjepan Radić’s peasant 
party. Frankist support was restricted to a 
certain section of the Zagreb bourgeoisie or 
else scattered in emigration, where former 
officers such as Stjepan Sarkotić organized 
small groups of anti-Yugoslav émigrés and 
exiles. 
We cannot, however, dismiss the 
Frankists on account of their small size 
and marginality in the 1920s. In the 1930s, 
a significant number of Frankists and ex-
Habsburg officers graduated to the Ustasha 
Croatian Revolutionary Organization (The 
Ustashe), the paramilitary-terrorist group 
which, whilst in government in the Nazi-
backed Independent State of Croatia (NDH, 
1941-1945), was responsible for the genocide 
of Jews, Serbs, and Roma. The transforma-
tion occurred after the promulgation of 
King Aleksandar’s dictatorship in 1929. The 
founders of the Ustashe, leading Frankists 
Ante Pavelić and Gustav Perčec (the latter 
a former Habsburg officer), decided that the 
dictatorship called for a more radical kind of 
resistance. Pavelić and Perčec recruited like-
minded Croats (including a number of ex-
Habsburg officers) to their cause: the violent 
overthrow of Yugoslavia and the realization 
of Croatian autonomy. Ustasha ideology and 
tactics were not entirely sui generis, howev-
er: to a great extent they were rooted in the 
Frankist movement and its programme of in-
tegral nationalism.
After 1918: (Serbian) Civilization and its 
Discontents
If the Frankists were the great losers of the 
First World War, Serbian integral natio-
nalists were the winners. The creation of 
Yugoslavia in 1918 owed much to the Allied 
victory and Serbia’s role in that victory. That 
debt was evident in the set-up of the new sta-
te: the political, constitutional, and economic 
frameworks of Yugoslavia derived in large 
part from those of the pre-war Kingdom 
of Serbia. In addition to this, the pre-war 
Serbian army and gendarmerie supplied the 
model (and usually the personnel) for the 
Yugoslav army and gendarmerie. From these 
facts many historians of the interwar king-
dom have argued that Serbs considered the 
new state merely an enlarged Serbia in which 
the non-Serb lands were their spoils of war.33 
In fact, most Serbs were not willing to have 
their national identity subsumed within a 
Yugoslav identity and did not consider lands 
such as Croatia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia part 
of an ‘enlarged Serbia’. This is not to say that 
these lands were spared from exploitation 
and suppression by the Belgrade regime af-
ter 1918.34 However, full-scale assimilation, 
or Serbianization, after 1918 was restricted 
to those areas that Serbian integral national-
ists had coveted before the war: Macedonia, 
Kosovo, and the formerly Habsburg regions 
of ‘Serbian’ Bosnia. The Serbian national 
project of 1903-1914 recommenced after 
1918, but it was no longer inhibited by the 
existence of great empires. A look at the his-
tory of these regions in the 1920s shows the 
continuities between pre-war and post-war 
Serbian integral nationalism. The Yugoslav 
government did not acknowledge the separate 
character or status of the ‘southern regions’: 
Macedonia was ‘South Serbia’ and Kosovo 
was ‘Old Serbia’, or, once again, the ‘classical 
south’. The government categorized all Slavs 
living there as Serbs, and official policy called 
for their ‘assimilation’. Only Serbian schools, 
churches, and cultural organizations were al-
lowed to operate in the region; the Bulgarian 
language was removed from public and offi-
cial spheres. 
Once again, development and moderni-
zation were largely inseparable from nation-
alization and Serbianization. The classical 
south – along with Vojvodina in the north 
of Yugoslavia – was central to the post-1918 
programme of land reform and internal colo-
nization. Veterans of the Serbian army and 
their families were often the beneficiaries of 
this programme; they received plots of land 
throughout Macedonia and Kosovo. The 
government was open about the national-
izing aims of these policies: they hoped to 
create (Serbian) ethnic homogeneity in areas 
depopulated by war; they also hoped to raise 
the ‘national consciousness’ of areas that were 
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considered integrally Serbian (Macedonia 
and Kosovo) – or at least Yugoslav 
(Vojvodina).35 For former soldiers and četnici 
who became colonists, moving to the south 
was akin to taking part in a (Serbian) civi-
lizing mission. Representative of this trend 
was Stevan Simić, a četnik since before the 
war, a former student of noted Serbian ge-
ographer Jovan Cvijić, and a schoolteacher 
and journalist in post-war Macedonia. He 
wrote extensively and critically on the po-
litical corruption and anti-Serbian banditry 
in the classical south in the 1920s. Indeed, 
a number of journals appeared whose aim 
was to promote the region’s Serbian charac-
ter and the important work of the colonists; 
their titles suggest their nationalist content: 
Southern View, South Serbia, Serbian Kosovo. 
The contributors to these journals, men like 
Simić, highlighted the need for a systematic 
and sustained programme of colonization in 
the south to go hand in hand with the build-
ing of schools, hospitals, and other modern 
infrastructure, and more generally to raise 
the level of culture in the regions. As one 
proponent of colonization as nationalization 
put it at a lecture in Mitrovica, colonists from 
‘more cultured parts’ could show southern-
ers that ‘love towards progress and work is a 
greater ideal than the traditional and nasty 
practice of bloody revenge’, i.e., modernity 
and modernization were ideals to strive for in 
the still underdeveloped classical south.36 It 
was an ideal also held by the Circle of Serbian 
Sisters, whose members were once again ac-
tive in the region after a wartime hiatus. Just 
as before the war, the humanitarian and char-
itable work of the women focussed in large 
part on Kosovo and Macedonia; because 
those were the poorest regions of Yugoslavia, 
but also because the work of nationalization 
needed to continue here. 
In the north, too, colonization was linked 
to nationalization, although of a different 
The Architect of Great Serbia: Radical Party leader and wartime prime minister Nikola Pašić (right), with the 
diplomat Jovan Jovanović ‘Pižon.
Source: Archiv Jugoslavije
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sort. In Vojvodina – formerly a Habsburg 
region – the need for modernization was less 
urgent than in the south, but the presence of 
a large population of ethnic Hungarians and 
Germans meant there was a need to reinforce 
the ‘national element’ here. As one national 
worker put it in a publication of 1931, ‘Bačka 
and Banat [districts in Vojvodina] are the 
least national of all our regions – even less 
so than South Serbia, since there the popu-
lation is three-fifths Slav, here is it just two-
fifths.’ The aim of nationalization in these 
parts was to create a majority population of 
‘Yugoslavs’.37 Note the author’s terminology, 
‘Yugoslavs’, not ‘Serbs’; unlike the southern 
regions, Vojvodina was considered a Yugoslav 
rather than a Serbian territory. It is not ac-
cidental, in this respect, that many colonists 
in the north were ‘Yugoslav volunteers’, i.e., 
Habsburg South Slavs who had fought in the 
Serbian army during the war. The intellectu-
als and national workers amongst the volun-
teers considered themselves first and fore-
most Yugoslavs (rather than Serbs, Croats, 
or Slovenes); many of them received parcels 
of land in Vojvodina. In a memorandum is-
sued publicly to the government in 1923 the 
Volunteer Union, a veterans’ organization, 
called upon the government to settle former 
volunteers in Vojvodina to keep ‘separatists’ 
and ‘anational elements’ in check.38
Violence attended this nationalizing pro-
ject, as it had before the war. This was espe-
cially true in Macedonia and Kosovo, where 
the Yugoslav authorities met significant re-
sistance from Albanian ‘Kaçak’ guerrillas 
and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (VMRO). Settlers were both 
perpetrators and victims of violence here 
during the interwar period. On the one 
hand, former četnici established paramili-
tary groups such as the ‘Association Against 
Bulgarian Bandits’ – based in Štip – osten-
sibly for self-defence, its members often ter-
rorized the non-Serb population. On the 
other hand, Kaçaks and the VMRO killed, 
kidnapped, and terrorized civilian settlers 
and the Serbian population with the aim of 
discouraging further settlement in the re-
gion. Rudolf Archibald Reiss estimated that 
by 1923 as many as 300 Serbs (excluding 
soldiers and gendarmes) had been killed in 
guerrilla attacks in Macedonia and Kosovo.39
The creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 was not 
a tabula rasa for Serbian integral nationalism; 
neither were Yugoslav and Serbian national 
projects co-extensive in the interwar period. 
The colonization and land reform policies 
and the support for them from former sol-
diers and četnici in the south show that the 
programme of Serbian integral nationalism 
of 1903-1914 was revived after 1918. In fact, 
the programme accelerated after the end of 
the war, since it was no longer encumbered by 
great empires and could be carried out within 
the borders of a sovereign state. The relation-
ship between the Serbian and Yugoslav na-
tion-building projects in the 1920s was not 
one of identity, as the differences between 
policies in the south and in Vojvodina dem-
onstrate, it was rather a relationship of com-
patibility; in the first decade after the forma-
tion of Yugoslavia, this compatibility held.
The Failures of Yugoslavia and the Harde-
ning of Serbian Nationalism
Given these favourable conditions, it is per-
haps surprising that the nationalizing project 
of the interwar period was unsuccessful. The 
lack of security in Kosovo and Macedonia 
led to many colonists moving away from the 
regions; many more were discouraged from 
moving south in the first place. The regions 
remained the least developed in Yugoslavia 
throughout the interwar period. This pro-
blem was actually exacerbated by the official 
policy of land reform, since it favoured former 
soldiers and četnici who were either not quali-
fied to till the land, or else were not provided 
with the appropriate equipment to do so by 
the government. The concerns voiced in nati-
onalist journals from Kosovo and Macedonia 
became increasingly impatient with the lack 
of progress made towards nationalizing the 
regions. The contributors to these journals, 
many of them former četnici, complained that 
colonization and land reform programmes 
were ‘unsystematic’, that corruption was rife 
– especially in politics, and that a national 
culture in the south was conspicuous only 
in its absence. Adam Pribićević, a prominent 
journalist and settler (and brother of the lea-
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der of the Independent Democratic Party 
Svetozar Pribićević), wrote of the extreme 
hardships that colonists faced in the south in 
his memoirs From a Gentleman to a Peasant. 
Pribićević’s book catalogued the failures of 
the Serbian civilizing mission in the south: 
constant danger of Kaçak raids, the unsys-
tematic approach to settlement taken by the 
government, the corruption of civil servants 
and politicians.40 Those shortcomings were 
also reflected in the most successful novel 
about the ‘Serbian South’ in the interwar 
period: Anđeljko Krstić’s Trajan (1932). The 
novel’s protagonist grows up in the Ottoman 
Balkans and goes to war with the Serbian 
army for the ‘liberation and unification’ of the 
southern regions. After 1918 he returns to 
find his home just as benighted in Yugoslavia 
as it had been under the Ottomans. He even-
tually succumbs to the hardships of life in the 
post-war ‘classical south’, dying of tuberculo-
sis. The author of Trajan had captured the 
sense of failure and disappointment that, for 
many Serbian nationalists, marked the re-
cent history of the classical south. 
It was not the case, however, that the clas-
sical south was merely a black mark on an 
otherwise good report: Yugoslavia’s failures 
were not restricted to the ‘Serbian’ regions 
of Kosovo and Macedonia. Throughout the 
1920s the country’s politics had been in 
a state of permanent crisis. In 1929 King 
Aleksandar suspended parliament indefinite-
ly and promulgated a personal dictatorship 
that lasted until his death in 1934. Concerned 
by the lack of progress the country had made 
in its first ten years, Aleksandar hoped to 
integrate Yugoslavia ‘from above’ by forc-
ing a supranational identity on his subjects 
that would replace existing ‘tribal’ (that is: 
national) identities. Despite the best efforts 
of the king and his supporters, the period of 
royal dictatorship was also a failure: South 
Slavs were not unified by Aleksandar’s ‘top-
down’ Yugoslavism, they were pushed farther 
apart. The dictatorship ended abruptly when 
Aleksandar was assassinated in October 
1934 (by Croatian and Macedonian extrem-
ists, see below), but it had been failing for 
some time before that.
If Aleksandar had looked closely at the 
passions that drove the Serbian national 
project in Macedonia and Kosovo, he might 
have understood the task he faced. As already 
noted, Serbs, like other South Slavs, were not 
willing to relinquish their national identity in 
Yugoslavia. The authority of the king and the 
Karađorđević dynasty muted opposition to 
the dictatorship in Serbia; with Aleksandar 
gone, Serbian criticism of Yugoslavia became 
louder. After 1934, the relationship between 
Yugoslavia and Serbia seemed to be less and 
less one of compatibility. Failures in the south 
and divisions within Serbian politics gave 
many Serbian nationalists cause for reflec-
tion: they wondered what had happened to 
the unity and the sense of purpose the Serbs 
had in the pre-war kingdom from 1903-1914 
(and it was this backward gaze that contrib-
uted greatly to the subsequent image of this 
period as a ‘golden age’).  Preoccupied with 
the notion that Serbs were not united in 
Yugoslavia, a group of Serbian intellectuals 
formed the Serbian Cultural Club in 1937: 
a ‘non-political’ and ‘non-party’ organization 
whose aim was to promote Serbian values 
and interests in Yugoslavia.41 The club and its 
supporters saw themselves as the true heirs 
of the Serbian nation since 1903. As the edi-
tor of the Club’s journal, Dragiša Vasić – a 
veteran of the First World War – put it, ‘For 
once a Serbian voice should be heard [the 
club’s journal was called The Serbian Voice], 
free from all foreign theories and party bi-
ases, so that a strong Serbdom can permeate 
Yugoslavia with its esprit de corps and stand 
as a testament for future generations.’42 The 
Serbian Cultural Club, true to its roots, 
was also Janus-faced: non-political but con-
sistently in opposition to the Yugoslav re-
gime, its members professed loyalty to both 
Yugoslavia and Serbia but increasingly placed 
one in opposition to the other. And whilst 
ostensibly modern and progressive, its mem-
bers sought extreme solutions. The two sides 
are present in Vaso Čubrilović’s notorious 
memorandum to the Serbian government 
in 1937, having to do with ‘The Explusion of 
Arnauts [Albanians]’. Čubrilović advised that 
‘[T]he only way and means to cope with them 
[Albanians] is the brute force of an organized 
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state’. He went on to suggest various legal 
harassments to which the Albanians could 
be subjected, ‘fines, imprisonments, the ruth-
less application of all police dispositions’, fail-
ing these, ‘[T]here remains one more means, 
which Serbia employed with great practical 
effect after 1878, that is by burning down 
Albanian villages and city quarters.’ 43 The 
Yugoslav government did not adopt any of 
Čubrilović’s suggestions, the country’s lead-
ers were not willing to resort to mass violence 
in times of peace. Čubrilović’s memorandum 
is indicative of a hardening of the Serbian 
national programme in the 1930s. It was 
this hardened programme that the Yugoslav 
Army in the Homeland (the Chetniks) put 
into effect during 1941-1945. 
Mass Violence during 1941-1945 and its 
Aftermath
Was the violence of 1941-1945 a reprisal of 
1914-1918? Not exactly, but there are some 
important associations. The Ustasha pro-
gramme, for example, owed much to the atti-
tudes and ideas of conservative supporters of 
Austria-Hungary before 1918: the Frankists 
and ex-Habsburg officers. The Ustashe often 
claimed it was the violence and suppression 
of the Alexandrine dictatorship of the 1930s 
which, in turn, drove them to violence and 
terrorism. In fact, their programme was as 
much anti-Serb as it was anti-Yugoslav. Like 
the Habsburgs before them, the Ustashe 
sought to solve the ‘Serbian problem’ on the 
territory they controlled. National Socialism 
inspired Ustasha genocide against Balkan 
Jews and Roma, but the genocide of Serbs 
in the Independent State of Croatia during 
the Second World War was entirely of their 
own design. There were structural similari-
ties to the Habsburg programme of Serbian 
The Soldier and his Ideologue: Dragaljub ‘Draža’ Mihailovic (centre) and Dragiša Vasić (far right) at 
the Chetnik congress in Ba, Serbia, January 1944.
Source: Archiv Jugoslavije 
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‘denationalization’ during the First World 
War (camps, suppression of cultural life); but 
the Ustasha programme was far more radical 
and therefore far more violent. The complete 
removal of Serbs from the Independent State 
of Croatia appears to have been the goal of 
Ustasha policy during 1941-1945, although 
conversion to Catholicism, either forced of 
voluntary, was also sanctioned. In both the 
First and the Second World War, this vision 
of an enlarged Croatia cleansed of Serbs and 
Serbian nationalism was the preserve of a mi-
nority: the Frankists, then the Ustashe. Both 
groups owed their influence to external po-
wers rather than popular support. 
The Yugoslav Army in the Homeland – 
the Chetniks – was to a certain extent the 
heir of the Serbian nationalist project that 
began in 1903. The ideology and intentions 
of this group are harder to place than those 
of the Ustashe. Unlike the Ustashe, the 
Chetniks did not have control of a state; they 
left far less of a paper trail of directives and 
orders for historians to follow. Dragoljub 
‘Draže’ Mihailović, the nominal leader of the 
Chetniks, did not have complete control over 
his forces and, initially at least, he wanted to 
keep them out of politics in order to focus 
on military matters. He was unsuccessful 
in this respect, and the politically inexperi-
enced Mihailović allowed Chetnik ideology 
to become defined by leading members of 
the Serbian Cultural Club such as Dragiša 
Vasić and Stevan Moljević. Just as they had 
during the interwar period, these intellectu-
als mulled over the proper relations between 
Serbia and Yugoslavia; once again they de-
cided in favour of the former. The Chetnik 
programme closely resembled the Serbian 
maximalist programme of the past; it was 
true to the spirit of Serbian nationalism after 
1903.44 The genocide against non-Serbs com-
mitted by the Chetniks during the Second 
World War was inspired by the pre-war at-
tempts to Serbianize and nationalize areas 
such as Kosovo and Macedonia. Now the 
programme was shifted to Serb-populated 
areas of Bosnia. 
The Chetniks had almost no support out-
side of Serb populated lands, and the Ustashe, 
eventually, lacked support anywhere, with 
the possible exceptions of larger Croatian cit-
ies such as Zagreb and Karlovac. Both were 
narrowly nationalist movements operating 
in nationally-mixed areas, factors which con-
tributed to a) the use of mass violence by the 
Ustashe and the Chetniks to create ethni-
cally homogenous areas, and b) their lack of 
success in Yugoslavia. The socialist Partisans 
were the only truly Yugoslav resistance force 
during 1941-1945, and they drew the sup-
port of many non-Communists throughout 
the country. This fact has led one eminent 
historian of the civil war in Yugoslavia to ask 
whether, by 1945 ‘for many, Yugoslavia was 
again, perhaps, not a bad idea, and one that 
was certainly better than the alternatives ex-
perienced during that period?’ 45 Perhaps, or 
perhaps the Partisans were merely the best of 
a bad bunch, the only combatant in the civil 
war whose violence was contextual rather 
than programmatic.
If the Partisans supported a return to 
Yugoslavia against the nationalist projects of 
the Ustashe and the Chetniks, their design 
for the new state was truly revolutionary. 
Unlike the centralized interwar kingdom, 
the second Yugoslavia was a federation of so-
cialist republics. Macedonia was no longer an 
integral part of Serbia, but a republic in its 
own right, as was Bosnia: separate from both 
Croatia and Serbia. Kosovo was more prob-
lematic. The socialists incorporated Kosovo 
into Serbia, but not on the same terms as in 
the interwar kingdom: it was made an ‘auton-
omous region’ within the Serbian socialist re-
public. We can see, then, the important ways 
in which the socialists rejected the politics of 
the interwar period. Yugoslavia was reborn, 
but as a very different entity. Much was made 
by Serbian nationalists in the 1980s about 
the socialists’ reluctance to allow Serbian 
and Montenegrin colonists from the inter-
war period to return to Kosovo after 1945 
(they had been expelled during 1941-1945). 
In fact, the colonization programme, as we 
have seen, was already in retreat at the end 
of the 1920s, the number of settlers remain-
ing in 1941 was small, and by 1945 many of 
them did not want to return to the southern 
regions at all.46 The inability of Serbian in-
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tegral nationalists to Serbianize Macedonia 
and Kosovo during the interwar period and 
the desire of the socialists to curb the kind of 
Serbian nationalism which had been so dam-
aging from 1903-1945 contributed to the 
decision to separate the regions from Serbia. 
This separation incubated autonomous senti-
ment from 1945 onwards and contributed to 
their eventually breaking away from Serbia 
and Yugoslavia in the last decade of the twen-
tieth century. In the case of Kosovo, violence 
in the region at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury shows that for many Serbs, the nation-
alist attitudes prevalent during 1903-1945 
were still relevant.
Conclusion 
Interwar Yugoslavia cannot be described 
as a peaceable kingdom, but it did not ex-
perience mass violence during 1918-1941. 
However, its short existence began and en-
ded in extreme violence, and it was stalked 
throughout the interwar period by Serbian 
and Croatian integral nationalisms. Serbian 
integral nationalists were for a short time in 
accord with Yugoslav state-builders, but in 
1930s they were increasingly separated from 
the Belgrade regime. One historian has des-
cribed the contortions and accommodations 
of the high politics of interwar Yugoslavia as 
a quest for the ‘elusive compromise’ between 
all parties that would make the state viable.47 
Rather than trying to follow these twists and 
turns, we could look instead at the continuity 
of Serbian integral nationalism from 1903-
1945 as a way of understanding the short-
comings of the state and the causes of mass 
violence in the Balkans. We could also look 
at its opponents amongst the South Slavs, the 
Frankists and their successors, the Ustashe. 
They were the ghosts at the Yugoslav ban-
quet, a trace of Austro-Hungarian policies 
in the Balkans, insignificant and ineffectual 
without external backing. When this bac-
Ustasha Violence: Mass shooting of Serbs by Ustashas in Bosanka Dubica 1941.
Source: Archiv Jugoslavije
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king came during the Second World War, 
the revived plan for denationalizing Serbia 
was more radical and violent than it had been 
during the First World War. The success of 
the Partisans was at the same time, of course, 
the failure of the Chetniks and the Ustashe, 
but it was also the failure of programmes of 
integral nationalism whose roots lay far dee-
per in the region’s history.  
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